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an economy with one consumption and one investment good, differential sectoral mark-
ups, and profit rates equalization. We show that when the investment function depends
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investment function) the paradox of thrift in its growth version may fail if mark-ups
are higher in the investment good sector. In this case, an increase in the saving rate
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Dating back to at least Mandeville’s popular Fable of the Bees (Mandeville, 1714[1988],
I, remark Q), the paradox of thrift became a central proposition in Macroeconomics after
the publication of Keynes’s General Theory of Employment Interest and Money (Keynes,
1936[1973]). It is also a distinguishing feature of the Kaleckian model of growth and distribu-
tion, where it appears both in a short- and in a long-run version. It states that an increase in
the saving rate produces a reduction of production and capacity utilization in the short-run,
and of the growth rate in the long-run. A remarkable feature of this result is its robustness
to the specification of the investment function, a contentious issue in Kaleckian economics.1
We investigate the validity of the paradox of thrift in a two-sector version of the Kaleckian
growth model. To the purpose, we consider an economy with one consumption and one
investment good, differential sectoral mark-ups, and profit rates equalization. We show that
the paradox of thrift is confirmed in both level and growth versions when investment is a
function of aggregate (average) capacity utilization or the profit rate. However, when the
investment function depends on both aggregate capacity utilization and on the aggregate
profit share, that is when the Bhaduri-Marglin investment function (Bhaduri and Marglin,
1990; Marglin and Bhaduri, 1990) is adopted, the paradox of thrift in its growth version
may fail if mark-ups are higher in the investment good sector. In this case, an increase in
the saving rate produces a reallocation of economic activity towards the investment good
sector; the aggregate profit share rises and its positive effect on investment may offset the
reduction in average capacity utilization.
Bhaduri and Marglin originally proposed their investment function to analyze the two-
sided role that variations in wages play in industrial capitalism (Bhaduri and Marglin, 1990,
p. 375). On the one hand, high wages stimulate demand as they increase workers’ capacity
to spend. This effect is responsible for the Keynesian ‘paradox of costs’, that is the positive
relation between labor costs and economic activity. The paradoxical nature of this result
stems from reversing the Marshallian microeconomic prediction that higher marginal costs
decrease firms’ optimal output. On the other hand, though, high wages may reduce demand
as they harm profitability and the incentive to invest. With the aid of the new investment
function Bhaduri and Marglin could take both effects into account while studying the relation
between income distribution and economic activity. As a result, this interaction became more
1The long-run nature of the paradox of thrift is more controversial in models with Harrodian features.
Competing views can be found in Shaikh (2009) and Hein et al. (2012) among others.
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complex than previously understood. Notably, when the profitability effect dominates, the
paradox of cost fails. The economy is in an exhilarationist regime, demand is profit-led.
Our paper is not concerned with exogenous changes in income distribution, since sectoral
mark-ups are given. As such, the adoption of the Bhaduri-Marglin investment function does
not serve its original purpose. However, we find it noteworthy that, besides having powerful
consequences regarding the paradox of cost, the Bhaduri-Marglin function may also affect
the paradox of thrift, admittedly in a specific economic environment.
While Harcourt (1965) produced the first two-sector model of distribution and em-
ployment with Keynesian features, the canonical two-sector Keynesian-Kaleckian model of
growth and distribution was developed in seminal contributions by Dutt (1988, 1990); Park
(1995); Dutt (1997a); Lavoie and Ramirez-Gaston (1997); Franke (2000). We derive our
result within a specific version of the model. It is obtained by introducing capital mobil-
ity, and the relative implication of profit rates equalization across sectors, in the standard
model. This refinement has been proposed by Dutt (1997a) in a discussion with Park (1995)
on the risk of over-determination in the Kaleckian two-sector model. The debate clarified
that in the canonical model, where the capital stock in each sector grows according to a
specific sectoral investment function, profit rates cannot be equalized in the short-run. If we
are to add capital mobility and profit rates equalization, we can only specify the aggregate
growth rate of the capital stock. This is the reason why the Bhaduri-Marglin investment
function we employ depends on the aggregate level of capacity utilization and profit share.
The combination of capital mobility and Bhaduri-Marglin investment function is ultimately
responsible for our result. If sectoral growth rates could be specified (the no capital mobility
case), they would depend on sectoral profit shares and capacity utilization rates. In this
scenario, the reallocation of resources that follows a change in the propensity to save would
not affect the profitability motive to invest. In fact, the average profit share would change,
but investment would depend on the sectoral ones, which would remain constant.
The two crucial assumptions of our paper, capital mobility and the Bhaduri-Marglin
investment function, may appear not perfectly compatible. While the profit rate determines
how capital moves across sectors, the measure of profitability relevant for investment deci-
sions is the profit share. But the two variables affect different decisions. Investment plans
consist in choosing the increment in the capital stock. As discussed above, the Bhaduri-
Marglin function may be desirable from this standpoint in that it allows to disentangle the
demand from the profitability effect of distributional changes. Capital mobility, on the other
hand, concerns the allocation of the level of the capital stock. However investment may be
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determined, it seems reasonable to assume that capital-owners will not overlook profit op-
portunities. As long as profit rates are not equalized, capital-owners can raise their profits
by shifting capital towards the more profitable sector.
The two-sector Kaleckian framework is recently experiencing a revival. Kim and Lavoie
(2017) have studied the convergence between the actual and the normal rates of capacity
utilization; Fujita (2018) has considered the growth implication of shocks to sectoral mark-
ups; Murakami (2018) has analyzed the effect of sectoral interactions on business cycles in a
Keynesian model; Beqiraj et al. (2019) have studied how changes in consumers’ preferences
and the saving rate may affect income distribution through changes in the composition of
output; Nishi (2020a) has introduced sectoral endogenous labor productivity growth, and
analyzed its effects on cyclical demand, growth and distribution; Nishi (2020b) has shown
that the introduction of Kaldor’s technical progress function leads to supply-led growth in
the long-run; Araujo et al. (2020) revisited the debate on over-determination of the model
in an evolutionary dynamics framework. None of these contributions, however, investigate
the paradox of thrift in the two-sector Kaleckian model when accumulation is based on the
Bhaduri-Marglin investment function.
Our theoretical framework adopts the standard Kaleckian mark-up pricing assumption,
where sectoral mark-ups are exogenous and independent of each other. Lavoie and Ramirez-
Gaston (1997) argued that this assumption is problematic, since mark-ups in the basic good
sector (the investment good in our case) indirectly affect price determination in the non-
basic consumption good sector. As a solution, they proposed to replace mark-up pricing
with target-return pricing, which means that firms set prices by targeting a specific return
rate when capacity utilization is at its normal level. We generalize our analysis by adopting
this alternative assumption. From a qualitative point of view, our results hold even while
taking into account the dependence of the consumption good sector mark-up on the one in
the investment good sector.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model and states
the theoretical results. Section 3 generalizes the main result of the paper when firms adopt
target-return, rather than mark-up, pricing. Section 4 offers some concluding remarks while
the most tedious proofs can be found in Section 5.
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2 The Model
2.1 Production and technology
The economy consists of a consumption (C) and an investment (I) good. Output in
both sectors (Xi) is produced through a sector-specific Leontief production function:
Xi = min[uiBiKi, AiLi], i = C, I (1)
where B and A are capital and labor productivities, K is the capital stock, L is em-
ployment, and u ≤ 1 is the degree of capacity utilization. When u = 1, output is at its full
capacity level (Xp). Capital does not depreciate. Profit maximization ensures:
Xi = uiBiKi = AiLi. (2)
We normalize capital productivities Bi = 1.
2.2 Society and saving assumptions
There are two classes in society. Capitalists earn profits on the capital stock they own. They
save the share s > 0 of their income. Workers earn the wage rate w and do not save. Since
labor is homogeneous and workers can move freely without costs, the wage rate is uniform
across sectors. Labor supply is infinitely elastic and never constrains growth or production.
2.3 Mark-up prices
In standard Kaleckian fashion, firms set prices by charging an exogenous sector-specific
constant mark-up (zi) over unit labor cost. If we let pi be the price of good i, and we
choose the consumption good as the numeraire we have pC = 1 = (1 + zC)w/AC and















where γ ≡ AC/AI , is the relative labor productivity ratio. We define the relative price as
p ≡ pI/pC = pI .
2.4 Value added distribution
In each sector, value added is distributed as wages and profits to labor and capital employed
in production. If we let ri be the profit rate in sector i we have piXi = wLi + ripIKi,














We distinguish consumption depending on its income source. We denote consumption out
of wages as Cw, and consumption out of profits as Cπ, so that
XC = C
w + Cπ. (7)
Investment good output is fully absorbed in the accumulation of capital. If we let g be the
growth rate of the aggregate capital stock we have
XI = gK. (8)
2.6 Balanced growth
Since workers do not save, the whole wage fund is spent as consumption out of wages. Using
(2) we have























(uCKC + γuIKI) . (9)
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On the other hand, capitalists’ propensity to consume out of profits is (1−s). Accordingly
Cπ = (1− s) (rIpKI + rCpKC) ,




(zCuCKC + zIγuIKI) .




(uCKC(1 + (1− s)zC) + γuIKI(1 + (1− s)zI)) .
Define δ ≡ KC/K ∈ (0, 1) as the share of the capital stock employed in the consumption
good sector; δ is the endogenous variables responsible for the instantaneous equalization of
sectoral profit rates. Dividing both sides of the previous equation by K and rearranging
yields
δuC = (1− δ)uIγ
(1 + (1− s)zI)
szC
= (1− δ)uIγΓ(s), (10)
where Γ(s) ≡ (1+(1−s)zI)szC and Γ
′(s) < 0. Let us now turn to the equilibrium in the investment
sector. Remembering from (2) that XI = uIKI , we can divide both sides of equation (8) by
K to find
uI(1− δ) = g. (11)
Next, we impose the equalization of profit rates across sectors, so that
rC = rI = r. (12)






2One may argue that firms could achieve profit rates equalization by adjusting mark-ups rather than
shifting capital across sectors. If we think that the Kaleckian framework is typically thought of as represen-
tative of markets with few big firms with market power, this is likely a more realistic assumption. However,
it would make sectoral distribution endogenous thus changing dramatically the nature of the model. This
tension between the assumptions of exogenous mark-ups and profit rates equalization points to a possibly
imperfect harmony between the Kaleckian model and capital mobility.
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We close the model with three alternative investment functions that generalize the standard
assumptions of Kaleckian growth to the two-sector growth model; we assume that investment
depends either on the rate of capacity utilization, on the profit rate, on the profit share or
on some combination of them. We have already mentioned that the instantaneous profit
rates equalization implies that sectoral capital stocks are not state variables, and that only
aggregate investment and growth can be defined. This hypothesis also implies that firms
will have to look at average, rather than sectoral, utilization rates, profit rates and profit
shares when making their investment decision. In fact, given total investment, firms will
discover the share of the capital stock and investment employed in either sector only after
profit rates are equalized.
If we let the average degree of capacity utilization in the economy be ū, and the aggregate
profit share be π, we take into account the following investment functions:
• the first one extends to the two-sector case the early Kaleckian models that had ca-
pacity utilization as determinant of investment (Amadeo, 1986a; Dutt, 1997b)
g1 = g(ū); (14)
• the second one assumes investment to depend on the profit rate, the ‘stagnationist’
investment function (Taylor, 1985; Amadeo, 1986b)
g2 = g(r); (15)
• the third one generalizes the Bhaduri-Marglin investment function (Bhaduri and Mar-
glin, 1990; Marglin and Bhaduri, 1990) by positing that growth depends on both
aggregate capacity utilization and the profit share
g3 = g(ū, π). (16)
Under the first and third specifications, the model consists of four equations, (10),(11),
(13), and either (14) or (16), for the four unknowns δ, uI , uC , g. When the investment function
is (15), the unknowns are δ, uI , uC , r, g in the five equations (10), (11), (12), (13), and (15).
In all three cases we can plug (13) into (10) to find the equilibrium share of capital employed
in the consumption goods sector3





∈ (0, 1). (17)
The aggregate profit share, that is the ratio between the value of total profits and value










(1− δ) ((1 + zC) Γ(s) + 1 + zI)
=
zCΓ(s) + zI
(1 + zC)Γ(s) + (1 + zI)
, (18)
where we used (2), (4), (5), (6), (10), (12) and (17). Inspection of (18) shows that π∗ is
economically meaningful being bounded between zero and one. It is a function of sectoral
mark-ups and the saving rate.
We can state:
Proposition 1. an increase in the saving rate raises the equilibrium profit share if and only
if zI > zC .
Proof. see Appendix (section 5.1).
A rise in the saving rate reduces capitalists’ consumption, so that the composition of
output changes in favor of the investment sector. If mark-ups in the investment sector
are higher than in the consumption sector (zI > zC), the reallocation generates a rise in
the aggregate profit share. This finding is not particularly original. Beqiraj et al. (2019),
for example, obtained a similar conclusion; but it is instrumental in developing our main
argument.
Our next step is to verify whether the paradox of thrift holds under the alternative
investment functions we have proposed. In order to obtain closed-form solutions for the
growth rate, and in line with most of the Kaleckian tradition, we assume linear functional
forms. Let us start with the accelerator version of investment:












We can use (10) to find:








uI(1− δ) = g = (21)







which, by factoring uI(1− δ), solves for the steady state growth rate of the first model as a









Since Γ′(s) < 0, the growth rate is a negative function of the saving rate and the paradox
of thrift holds in its growth version. Given that g1 = β0+β1ū, a reduction in the equilibrium
growth rate necessarily requires a decline in the equilibrium aggregate capacity utilization
ū∗: the paradox of thrift in its level form is confirmed.
The second investment function makes investment dependent on the profit rate:
g2 = λ0 + λ1r. (23)
Hence, we can use rI = r =
zI
1+zI
uI , to find
uI(1− δ) = g = (24)















We show in the Appendix (section 5.2) that dg∗2/ds < 0. The paradox of thrift in its
growth version is confirmed also under the second type of investment function. The paradox
of thrift in level form also holds. Since g2 = λ0+λ1r, a lower growth rate is accompanied by
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a lower equilibrium profit rate. Both utilization rates are in a direct relation with the profit
rate so that both necessarily decline; the aggregate utilization rate, which is a weighted
average of the sectoral utilization rates, will also drop.
We now turn to the main result of our paper, and we investigate how growth responds
to changes in the saving rate under a Bhaduri-Marglin investment function. In linearized
terms, we can specify the function as
g3 = µ0 + µ1ū+ µ2π. (26)
Hence,
uI(1− δ) = g = (27)
















We are now able to state:












) ((1 + zC)Γ(s) + (1 + zI))
2
.
Proof. see Appendix (section 5.3).
A rise in the saving rate has two opposing effects on growth. On the one hand, there
is the standard depressing effect due to the reduction in capitalists’ consumption and, in
turn, in aggregate demand and capacity utilization. On the other hand, though, the higher
propensity to save entails a shift in the composition of output away from consumption goods.
When the profit share is higher in the investment goods sector, the aggregate profit share
rises thus producing a positive incentive to invest. When investment is sufficiently more
sensitive to profitability than to economic activity, that is when µ2/µ1 is ‘high enough’, the
paradox of thrift in its growth version fails.
On the other hand, the paradox of thrift in level form applies. From (28), we can see
that dg∗3/ds < 0 when µ2 = 0; but since g3 = µ0 + µ1ū(s) + µ2π(s) this can happen
only if the aggregate utilization rate decreases with the saving rate. We provide a formal
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proof of this result in the Appendix (section 5.2). This conclusion shows that the demand
regime is always stagnationist : the increase in the profit share due to the higher saving rate
necessarily reduces capacity utilization. As shown in Blecker (2002), this is an implication
of the linear functional form assumed for the Bhaduri-Marglin investment function. More
general functional forms may be able to produce the strong response of investment to the
profit share necessary to generate the exhilarationist regime.
2.6.1 Discussion
In order to better understand the mechanism underlying our main result, we can focus
on the function Γ(s). In fact, the propensity to save only enters the system through Γ(s).
First, remember that from (2) Li = uiKi/Ai, so that LC/LI = uCKCAI/ [uIKIAC ]=
δuC/ [(1− δ)uIγ] . Next, (10) shows that Γ(s) = δuC/ [(1− δ)uIγ] = LC/LI , so that Γ(s)
equals the employment ratio in the two sectors. Therefore, a rise in the saving rate raises
employment and output in the investment sector relative to the consumption one. The
change in the composition of output towards the sector with the highest mark-up raises the
aggregate profit share (our Proposition 1). Second, Γ(s) enters the definition of aggregate
capacity utilization through (20). A higher propensity to save reduces capitalists’ consump-
tion, thus depressing the aggregate capacity utilization. The negative shock to capacity
utilization tends to depress the equilibrium growth rate; this effect can only be offset if in-
vestment reacts to the profit share as assumed in the Bhaduri-Marglin investment function
(our Proposition 2).
On a different note, it is important to emphasize the relevance of the capital mobility
assumption in producing our result. In the standard two-sector model, sectoral growth rates
would depend on sectoral profit shares and capacity utilization rates under the Bhaduri-
Marglin assumption. An increase in the propensity to save would change the aggregate
profit share, while leaving the sectoral ones unaffected. Therefore, there would be no change
in the profitability motive to invest. At the same time, capacity utilization in both sectors
would decrease. Sectoral growth rates and, in turn, the steady state growth rate would likely
fall. The paradox of thrift would not be compromised.
While capital mobility is essential for our result, perfect capital mobility is not. We
have assumed throughout the analysis that capital instantaneously adjusts to the specific
sectoral allocation that equalizes the two profit rates. As shown by Dutt (1997a, p. 447-
8), however, we can think of a version of capital mobility where sectoral capital stocks are
12
fixed at a point in time and the profit rate differential regulates the sectoral allocation of
aggregate investment rather than of the total capital stocks. In this version of the model,
aggregate investment would still depend on the average profit share and capacity utilization
as in (16); the allocation of investment between the two sectors, on the other hand, would
be governed by the profit rates differential according to: gI − gC = ξ(rI − rC), where ξ > 0
would measure the degree of capital mobility. In steady state, rI = rC and gI = gC so that
equations (11) and (13) would still hold. The system of equations that solves for δ, uI , uC , g
would be identical to the perfect mobility case. Our result would necessarily follow.
3 A Generalization: the Model with Target-Return Pricing
We developed our results under the standard mark-up pricing assumption that characterizes
one- and two-sector Kaleckian growth models. The assumption, however, is controversial. As
pointed out by Lavoie and Ramirez-Gaston (1997), since the investment good is a basic good,
the mark-up in the consumption sector should not be taken as exogenous and independent
of the mark-up in the investment sector.
We develop a generalization of the model that does not suffer from the critique. To the
purpose, we replace mark-up pricing with the target-return pricing assumption first proposed
by Lavoie and Ramirez-Gaston (1997) and more recently employed by Kim and Lavoie, 2017.
We show that the logic of our main results is confirmed even within a framework that takes
the interdependence between mark-ups into account.
Let us start by introducing the sectoral normal degree of capacity utilization, uni . Next,
we define the sectoral target rate of return (rni ) as the return rate that firms target when
output and sales correspond to the normal degree of capacity utilization, that is when
Xi = u
n
i Ki ≡ X
n
i . Given the target rate and normal output, the normal flow of profits (Π
n
i )












i . The equalization





i ) = r
n
i (1 + zI)Ai/(AIu
n
i ). (29)
Equation (29) shows that mark-ups in the investment good sector, i.e. the basic good




























Now, in our exercise we only consider a saving shock. No changes to mark-ups deter-
minants are analyzed and, in turn, the interdependence between the two sectors’ mark-ups
never comes into play. We can, however, substitute (30) and (31) into (18) to find the










































. We can now restate Proposition 1 as








Proof. See Appendix (section 5.4)
In order to interpret the emended condition for the positive relation between the saving
















C . We thus see that the necessary condition for the violation of the paradox of
thrift requires that the normal profit share (weighted by labor productivity) in the invest-
ment good sector be higher than in the consumption sector. In order to produce a rise in
the profit share, the rise in the saving rate must be associated to a reallocation of resources
towards the relatively more profitable sector. From a qualitative point of view, the result
confirms what we found under the mark-up pricing assumption.
Once the possibility that π′(s) > 0 is established, it will always be possible to find a
threshold for the relative weights of the profit share and capacity utilization in the investment
function (µ2/µ1) such that the paradox of thrift is violated. With respect to the result found






I rather than zC and
zI ; but the economic content is analogous.
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4 Conclusions
Our theoretical note shows that the paradox of thrift may not work in the Kaleckian growth
and distribution framework, once it is generalized to a two-sector economy. This possibility
arises because the saving rate affects not only the level of aggregate demand, but also its
composition. In particular, a rise in the saving rate, besides depressing aggregate demand,
shifts the sectoral composition of output towards the investment goods sector. If this sector
is characterized by relatively high mark-ups the aggregate profit share rises; and such an
increase in profitability may have a positive effect on growth if, as assumed in Bhaduri and
Marglin (1990) and Marglin and Bhaduri (1990), investment reacts to the profit share.
5 Appendix












2 , where we
used zC(1 + zI)− (1 + zC)zI = zC + zCzI − zCzI − zI .
Therefore π′(s) > 0 ⇔ zI > zC .
5.2 The paradox of thrift in the stagnationist version of the model



















































































) ((1 + zC)Γ(s) + (1 + zI))
2 .
Let us now turn to the utilization rate. From (11) and (20) we can write aggregate ca-



































































[µ0 [(1 + zC)Γ(s) + (1 + zI)] + µ2(zCΓ(s) + zI)] /D0
}




















[(1 + zC)Γ(s) + (1 + zI)] , it follows that dū
∗
3/ds < 0 always.
5.4 Proof of proposition 3
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